31 March 2022

Cogitation in the Time of War #24 - 34 days later


I was not able to do a detailed analysis on March 24th or 25th, around 1 month since the start of Putin's Invasion of Ukraine. But since February has only 28 days, today the 30th is the 35th day and so I can now look back on the previous 34 days of a war, although there are people who want to call it something else and a former portuguese spy, with a degree in International Law that turned into a despised commentator in the portuguese media, says that under the Law this is not a war because there was no formal declaration of war by either side. As I have written to date 24 pieces here (23 cogitations as I called them, plus the introductory text on the conflict) in addition to the dozens of comments and posts on Facebook and Twitter, I have plenty of material that allows me to recap before doing some new predictions (besides the ones I've made before).


Even before February 24th, I wrote this part in this Facebook post, about what I thought was going to occur (based on forecastas by different specialists and analists):
The troops from Crimea will cut off the East and the troops in Belarus can reach Kiev in an instant, but they might not even go there (their presence and the threat is a powerful deterrent by itself).
It will probably be like Georgia and they just secure the East of Ukraine (that will have self-proclaimed republics).

Expanding these predictions a little, there was the idea that the objective was to reach the Dnipro River that runs from North to South and in a way divides Ukraine in two, and that the Russians would be able to do this in a relatively short time, using the classic pincer movement, the double encirclement to surround the eastern part of the river, with troops coming from the south, as written above, and others coming from the north (those who entered via the Kharkiv region). At various times around these days, the idea that was always present was the return of the Cold War in which Ukraine would now take the role of a Germany divided in 2, the West supported by NATO and the East under Moscow's rule. The Dnipro River would be like the equivalent to the Berlin Wall, but this time a real natural barrier separating the 2 blocks.
I never thought that the Ukrainian Armed Forces could withstand a conventional war as it has been the case. The (almost unanimous) general consensus was that the Ukrainian defenses would collapse in a few days, unable to withstand the great pressure, and the greater firepower, of the Russians with many units retreating to the west of the country, forming a line well behind the Dnipro (to have a safety margin, a line passing through Zhytomyr and Uman to give you an idea). What would follow later would be a big resistance, in the style of the Iraq insurgency, only much more frequent and much more violent.
So it's not surprising that the Russians thought the same too and had planned a campaign, or special operation as they keep saying, lasting a few days. The biggest difference has to do with the idea that Kyiv would really fall and the Russians would install a new government and control the country. I didn't think they would go that far nor that it would easy to control the whole country, and I guess that, even though I was wrong in what has happened so far, this aspect has been proven to be a Russian illusion.


The truth is that after 34 days the unthinkable (at the time) is now a possibility! I wrote in another text somewhere (I thought I knew where but now I can't find it, I'll add the reference here when I do), that Ukraine now has a good chance, I even say 50%, of getting an overall tactical victory on the ground (strategically they already won this war). Ukraine already had several tactical victories: the capture of Kharkiv, the Battle of Kyiv (attempted siege and subsequent capture of the capital) and the advance on Mykolaiv (which was part of the larger advance on Odesa, the real objective) which was repulsed. and even counterattacked in part. But one of the best examples of victory on the ground that serves to show the future possibility is the region (oblast) of Sumy where not only Ukrainian forces avoided the conquest of the city by the Russians but later launched a counter-offensive that pushed Russian troops back to the border!
This is really unthinkable, something that I, and most if not all, of the analysts, never imagined happening. The best Ukrainian units were supposed to be completely out of combat after 2~3 weeks, their defenses completely overrun, overstretched and overloaded, practically out of commission, the Ukrainians were not supposed to still have armoured units, much less tanks, available at this point to even cover an withdraw, let alone counterattack!
I use again two adjectives that were very common in my reactions during the first days: what the Ukrainians managed to do (in defense and in counterattack) is shocking and surreal!
 
It was my goal for this retrospective analysis to mainly highlight what I got wrong instead of what I got right, but I have to single out a small action and my reaction to it, because it was only days later that I realized the importance of the moment and how I ended up, without really knowing it, to accurately foreseen the significance of that moment. 4 weeks ago I reacted t a tweet with a photo of Ukrainians engaging near Ivankiv, northwest of Kyiv and about halfway to Chornobyl. The tweet suggested that the Ukrainians had reoccupied (a part of) this city, which would allow them to control the main roads that pass through it, and if that was to be the case, this was a gigantic blow to the entire Russian operation of capturing Kyiv. At that time, I really thought that if the Ukrainians controlled Ivankiv, they would isolate Russian troops south of that point and it would be all over, the Russians would stand no chance to do anything about this line of advance (or front, to use another term) ever again. The subsequent few days continued to have some Russian advances and exchanges of positions around Kyiv so I thought that the action in Ivankiv was an isolated one, probably done by Special Forces, deep in the Russian rear to attack their logistics or simply cause confusion and delay. But surprise, surprise, it was around this time that the main Russian advance grounded to an halt! And gradually after that, Ukrainian forces regained some ground in northwest Kyiv.
I assumed that I overreacted at first and was most likely wrong, but in fact that action in Ivankiv was strong proof that the Ukrainian tactics were working and one of the first signs, which went mostly unnoticed as it seemed insignificant, of the turnaround that is now visible and confirmed (with the Russians admitting they will not advance further, evidenced by the fact that they are digging down and taking up defensive lines along their current positions)


What's contributing a lot to this Ukrainian tactical success, and also to the strategic success, is the strong support, direct and undirect, from NATO and the EU. And that includes the sanctions applied to Russia that have already created internal division (even if only between Putin and the oligarchs who have long supported him). Many people thought or still think (and I admit that I also thought it too), that sanctions would not really work because they would have a reduced impact but above all there would be no union and cohesion to continue with them and enforce them especially in the EU, where the national interest of countries would take precedence over the global interests of the block. I never thought that countries like Germany and Finland, so dependent on Russian energy (oil but mainly natural gas) would go ahead with sanctions at the risk of running out of energy for their industry and above all the risk of not having enough gas for the people to heat their homes. But one thing I did beleive was confirmed: Russia is more dependent on money that comes from Europe than Europe is dependent on products that come from Russia. Note that Russia has threatened retaliatory sanctions but has not reduced nor closed the taps for the gas pipelines! I find it remarkable.
And little by little, Russia starts to stop, running out of money, products in supermarkets and soon there will be (even more) shortage of parts to repair military equipment, and even to continue extracting oil or gas. Because although the Russians have huge natural reserves in their territory, the equipment that allows them to extract and process these resources comes almost entirely from abroad. When it will be time for doing the scheduled maintenance and repairs, they'll be empty-handed. There are those who think that Russia is still the Soviet Union, which manufactured (almost) everything itself (until it stopped and went bankrupt) but now Russian industry is itself completely dependent on foreign imports, even the "mighty"military industry. News reports have already surfaced that the only tank production plant still running in the country has completely stopped its lines, and we have to take notice at this point that this plant was supposed to have produced and delivered around 2300 new T-14 Armata tanks between 2015 and 2020, but the sanctions that were imposed after 2014 due to the annexation of Crimea (or maybe due to the downing of flight MH17) delayed everything (due to lack of components) and only about 100 test tanks were produced until now.

And the other more direct support is the large supply of weapons, namely portable anti-tank missiles, which allow the Ukrainian light infantry to continue their attacks behind the Russian lines, causing confusion and panic and greatly disrupting their logistics. NATO, and other aligned countries, cannot offer more direct help (putting troops on the ground or imposing the (in)famous no-fly zone); this is an impossibility and only the delusional people can think that this would be a good solution. It's only a good solution if people what the Final Solution, because an escalation of the fight will only bring more suffering to all sides and the current one is already more than enough. And the more the conflict escalates, the more close we get to a nuclear holocaust. I'd rather live (if I were to survive) without such a thing...
And yeah, it's true that Zelenskyy keeps asking for intervention from NATO or other countries, but that's part of his role. I compare it to a seller haggling over a sale (in this case he is selling the need to support Ukraine) and by asking a very high price (direct intervention) he pushes the buyers (the EU and NATO in particular) to offer more than they were initially willing to give.

I mentioned the cohesion within the EU, something that many people thought would end and each one would go their own separate way (again I include myself here, but I was hopeful it wouldn't), but in fact we are witnessing a strengthening of the Union, although there still those who seem to be playing a different tune, for example France and Macron, who insists in maintaining a dialog with Putin when others, including Biden, have already admitted that they cannot continue to negotiate with him, that there is no point in persisting with the talking and that the time has come to act, I have to admit that it's always beneficial, and in way necessary, to maintain a dialog window for as long as possible, because for now there is only one theater of operations and only 2 countries are in direct war against each other. France is one of the few global powers on this side (the so-called West) that is willing to assume the role of negotiator and that is why Macron continues to make his regular calls to Putin that in reality  changes nothing (Macron asks him to stop the invasion and Putin either ignores it or just says no) and they serve no other purpose than to keep the communication route open. I do not believe that Macron is innocent or cynical by maintaining this stance. The Turkish diplomats themselves, who managed to organise these latest negotiations, that seem to bring important progress, said that one cannot stop talking to Russia because if we do there will no longer be a way to negotiate a possible peace, if there's no one listening to what they might have to say.


And obviously I have to talk about the farcical show on the last few days: Russia official statements that the first stage of their "special military operation" ended with success, with all goals achieved, and now they'll concentrate on the true, and only, real reason for invading, the Donbas! So this was all to ensure the safety of Donbas after all and all the other attacking lines of advancement (fronts) were nothing but a (gigantic and very costly both in personnel and in equipement) diversion maneuver! Of course it was, it was plain for all to see!
Now it's time to go back to the first chapter/section of this retrospective analysis of mine, because after all, this "explanation" that has now emerged matches what was thought and I what I also predicted myself. I mean, a smaller version, since I thought they would occupy the whole of Eastern Ukraine (beyond the Dnipro River). As I later wrote in the Cogitation #4, I later realised that one of the main objectives would be to occupy the entire Ukrainian coast (and thus turn Ukraine into a landlocked country). With the Donbas linked to Crimea by land and then continuing to Transnistria (Moldova), Russia could create what is called Novorossiya with a territory a little smaller than the one in the original project for the confederation, and this Novorossiya concept is another argument in favour of the motive presented in the video about the economic resources (the one I mention in Cogitation #4).
But I don't want to waste any more time on this subject of the Russians' apology, or revelation. I know that for those who don't believe, or don't want to believe, that Putin really wanted to control Ukraine as part of his new Russian Empire (I've read many people mention that Russia, unlike many European and US countries, doesn't even have even a history of imperialism, but I made this meme specially for them) because it is very clear that this is an attempt to save face and to come up with an internal victory speech of some sort, a victory they can "sell" to the Russian people.


But now I'll put my ponti hat of fortune teller (or prophet) and make a prediction for the future: that internal victory won't even happen! This is what I now believe after seeing the unthinkable occuring, as I wrote up above, in the previous paragraphs.
Surrounding the Ukrainian forces in the East, what is called the JFO (Joint Forces Operation), is far from guaranteed, even discounting Ukraine's own troops and equipment redeployment to this front (from the others that become passive). I say this because the Russians are quite worn out and it seems to me that it is by now clear they have used up much of their munition stock. Nor can we forget that it was here that the best Ukrainian troops were stationed at the time of the invasion, with very well-prepared defensive lines (albeit those were facing East). We need to just look at the gains in the Donbas made by the Russians and separatists since Feb, 24th; they are minimal and on top of that on this front they didn't suffer the logistical problems and were safe from attacks in their rear columns, that plagued the other fronts, especially the advance into Kyiv. The gains achieved in this territory corresponding to Novorossiya appear to be better than they actually are, in my opinion. And that is mainly due to the advance from the South (the troops coming from Crimea) and the siege of Mariupol, as well as the advance of those coming from the Northeast (the Kharkiv region). But after all these weeks, Mariupol is yet to be captured, and the troops coming from further North (who had to bypass Kharkiv as they failed there too) were unable to even begin the siege of the entrenched Ukrainian positions. The expected big breakthrough with major progress from the separatists' controlled territory never happened!
Now yes, the Russians will try their best in this region, but I believe the Ukrainians will also manage to send their own reinforcements, despite the Russians trying to hold back as many units as possible by taking defensive positions on the other fronts.
And will there be a possibility that the Russians will resume the attack on Kyiv if Ukraine devotes too much attention and resources on holding back the JFO? Yes, it's a possibility, but I don't think they can do it even if they want to do it and Putin orders them to do it (due to lack of motivation, lack of ability even, also due to the problems that continue to affect them and for which they don't seem to have a solution).

All this is more or less proved by yesterday's developments in the peace negotiations in Turkey. As it was announced (and I already commented in the Cogitation #23), the Russians apparently are now ready to accept Ukraine joining the EU. I'm still convinced that Ukraine's desire for membership was also one of the reasons for Putin's Invasion, and the fact that they now give up that demand shows that the Russians are aware that it is difficult to achieve any objective that would allow Putin to announce that they've achieved victory and the operation fulfilled its goals.
An outcome of this kind, after Putin starting a war against his smaller and weaker neighbor and getting defeated on almost all fronts, will be very difficult to swallow in Russia. I have little doubt that this will be the beginning of the end of the current regime in Moscow. And I say regime because there are no illusions; Russia is supposedly a democracy but Putin has been in power since the turn of the century, almost 22 years ago (the 4 years he was Prime Minister to Medvedev was just a subterfuge to get around the limit of consecutive terms), and someone being in power for so long only happens in those democracies where elections are "strange", like Russia's case (where in some electoral districts Putin got more than 100% of the votes, meaning they "counted" even more votes than the actual number of electors). Actually, Russia never experienced a "normal" democracy, where leaders and parties in power alternate every now and then, one time going more in a certain direction (nationalism and isolation type) and the other going in the opposite direction (more openness and dialogue with European partners). Maybe the consequences of this failed war will finally bring about a change in that huge country, a change where people who don't remember, much less miss, the "old times of glory" will assume power, and then can start a true new era of greater friendship with neighbors and greater cooperation with international communities. The same path that many other nations behind the former Iron Curtain (central and eastern Europe) started, such as Ukraine itself, which went through many difficulties and troubled times, with division and internal confrontation, until finally finding a new proper and unique identity that this war will actually cement, once and for all.

If we manage to prevent an escalation of the current conflict and avoid the direct involvement of neighboring countries (which would push NATO into war sooner or later), we will prevent the beginning of World War III (actually the fourth, as the third was the Cold War ) and the world will really become a better place, at least a little bit, in the medium/long term.

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